In 2019, Ladakh’s former Member of Parliament (MP), Jamyang Tsering Namgyal became a social media sensation for his famous speech in the Indian Parliament. He accused Congress governments of ignoring Ladakh since 1947 and termed it as “seven decades of neglect”. He quoted the famous statement by Nehru, ‘…not a blade of grass grows there…’ to drive home his point. As a BJP MP, he was speaking in support of the J&K Reorganisation Bill. It might be worthwhile to explore Nehru’s history with Ladakh.
This statement was made by Nehru during a debate in the Rajya Sabha on 31 August, 1959. It was in response to a ‘short notice question’ raised by then Rajya Sabha MP, Devendra Prasad Singh from Praja Socialist Party (PSP Bihar), which was founded by Jayaprakash Narayan in in 1952. He asked four questions of the then Prime Minister, who concurrently held the Minister of External Affairs portfolio. These deliberations occurred in the presence of distinguished Bharat Ratna, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, who served as the Vice President of India, ex-officio chair of the Rajya Sabha, and later as President of India. This underscores the high-profile nature of these debates and its institutional gravitas.
The questions raised by D. P. Singh pertained to the road built by the Chinese on Indian territory in Ladakh. D. P. Singh had asked, “In view of the fact that the Chinese claim is unjustified and no reply has been sent to the Indian government, does not the government contemplate ousting the Chinese from this Indian territory by force? Will not the Government of India at least consider the advisability of bombing the road, built in our territory, out of existence?” To this, Jawaharlal Nehru replied, “No, Sir. Government will not consider that course, because that is not the way government would like to function in such matters. The hon’ble member started by saying that this is admittedly Indian territory but the Chinese would not agree to it. That is a contradiction in terms. As a matter of fact, it is Indian territory and we claim it so because we think that the weight of evidence is in our favour—maps etc. But the Chinese produce their own maps, equally old, which are in their favour. And the territory is sterile. Ithas been described as a barren, uninhabited region without a vestige of grass and 17,000 ft. high…In places like this, decisions can only be made by conferences by agreement. Countries do not, should not, go to war without proceeding in those other ways over such matters.’
The misrepresentation of this rhetoric was addressed the same day when independent MP, Jaswant Singh stated, “The Prime Minister stated a little while ago that this portion of Ladakh is absolutely desolate and unfertile and that not even a blade of grass grows there. Even then, China is attaching importance to that area and is building a road there. I would like to know, when China is attaching so much of importance to this desolate bit of land, why, when the territory is ours or is under dispute even, we do not attach any importance to this area?” Nehru replied, “I spoke only about the Yehcheng area and not about the whole of Ladakh although the whole of Ladakh, broadly speaking, is 11,000 to 17,000 and 20,000 feet high. Presumably, the Chinese attach importance to this area because of the fact that this route connects part of Chinese Turkestan with Gartok-Yehcheng. This is an important connection.”
Another interesting pivot of this argument is to blame Nehru for the entire debacle of Line of Actual Control, and failure to intervene proactively in the Tibet issue in 1950, which brought China to the borders of India and undermined the treaties signed with Tibet. This narrative hints at the India-China border issue as a problem created by Nehru. However, history would be served better if we look back at the Shimla conference in October 1913 and July 1914. Republic of China, British Government of India, and Government of Tibet convened in Shimla to address the territorial and political status of Tibet and underline the boundary in an area marked by Tibet’s ambiguous relationship with India and China. Historian Kyle J. Gardener writes in his book, The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India–China Border, 1846–1962 that the British were wary of Chinese expansionism in 1911 after the Chinese revolution. The Chinese refused to accept the draft treaty prepared by the British as China wanted to assert control over the region and Tibet wanted autonomy.
Scholar of International Relations, Monika Chansoria has written that the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai tried repeatedly to alter Nehru’s position on Ladakh during three days of negotiations in April 1960 but failed to deter Nehru from his stand on Ladakh as Indian territory. He demanded that Chinese withdraw troops from this regions and that it was non-negotiable.
Journalist Rinchen Norbu Wangchuk has written that Nehru invited the 19th Kushok Bakula Rinpoche to Delhi and met him at his residence at Teen Murti to reassure Ladakh’s Buddhist community on 20 May 1949 and also accepted an invitation to visit Ladakh. Two months later, on 4 July, 1949, Nehru visited Ladakh. Undoubtedly, Kushok Bakula Rinpoche would have distanced himself from Nehru and Congress if they were harming Ladakh. Rinchen quotes a letter that Bakula Rinpoche had written to Indira Gandhi, which outlines what Nehru meant for Ladakh.
He wrote, “The passing away of our most beloved and distinguished Pandit ji is one of the saddest events in the history of man. Mother Earth has become poorer. Man will have to perform deeds of merit for thousands of years before [another] one like him walks upon this earth again…It is the pious wish of our people that a portion of the last remains of the ones who took so much interest in their well-being should be taken to Ladakh so that they may have the sacred opportunity of showing their reverence according to their religious rites. This implies the building of a Stupa and enshrining the sacred remains therein. I would, therefore, request you kindly to feel considerate to our deeper sentiments and oblige us by giving a portion of the last rites of our Pandit ji in favour of the people of Ladakh.”
China’s political history has been marked by significant policy shifts in response to varying regimes. The complex geopolitical manoeuvres surrounding Ladakh, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Kashmir has underlined the importance of Pakistan for Western powers. In this context, Nehru, against considerable odds, steadfastly maintained a commitment to Ladakh despite geopolitical unpredictability. He engaged in complex negotiations with China to delineate borders and strove to safeguard Ladakh’s strategic integrity. This was particularly challenging given that the region’s boundaries were a vestige of colonial cartographic delineations, contentious and susceptible to geopolitical manipulation. Nehru’s efforts to navigate these turbulent waters while preserving Ladakh’s status underscore his diplomatic resilience. The neglect of Ladakh can be attributed to systemic developmental inequities, compounded by its historical integration into J&K, which often marginalised the region. Nehru’s policies and priorities were influenced by a confluence of strategic, economic, and sociopolitical factors, and regional developmental deficits must be contextualised within this broader framework rather than ascribed solely to individual negligence or prejudice. Through Steven A. Hoffmann’s book, India and the China Crisis, we can understand that the complex border issue in Ladakh with China was a colonial problem. British attempts at creating a stable boundary line in this region was ongoing since 1865 resulting in multiple boundary lines, internal disunity between London and India offices, and clumsy dealing in the Shimla Conference 1914 on the Tibet Issue. Nehru had inherited these complex borders in the north with China as well as Pakistan. What Nehru did, however, was bring Ladakh and Kashmir closer to India based on principles that he envisioned for the world. Nehru’s efforts to consolidate these regions within the Indian framework reflect his broader geopolitical aspirations and the nuanced challenges of statecraft, balancing national interests with international dynamics in a highly sensitive regional context. It is crucial to recognise that Western political narratives have often perpetuated a distorted image of Nehru’s policies but were not necessarily personally antagonistic towards him. These perspectives were shaped by a geopolitical apprehension of a resurgent India, emerging from a legacy of anti-colonial struggle against Western imperialism. Thus, asking Nehru to defend himself in his absence is rhetorical manipulation that leverages the absence of a key figure to gain an undue advantage in the discourse of Indian nationalism, while diminishing the integrity of an individual.
By Mutasif Hussain
Mutasif Hussain (Thiksey) is former Assistant Professor in Delhi University and currently the Chief Coordinator of Ladakh Research Scholars Forum.
(Photograph credit: Bakula Labrang Spituk Gonpa)
